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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship 
that is unjust, much less that is unconstitutional . . .  " 1 
A movement is afoot to revise the longstanding presumption 
that in civil litigation the producing party bears the cost of 
production in response to discovery requests. An amendment to 
Rule 26( c ) -which took effect in December 2015-makes explicit 
courts' authority to issue protective orders that shift discovery costs 
away from producing parties.2 But this authority is not new;3 what 
* Earle K. Shawe Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
1. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (7 Wall.) 457, 552 (1870). 
2. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c), ("The court may, for good cause, issue an order 
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . .  (B) specifying 
terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or 
discovery." (emphasis added)). 
3. See id. committee note, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf ("Rule 26( c )( 1 )(B) is amended to 
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is new is what may be coming next-an undoing of the producer­
pays presumption itself. Thus far, the sentiment to move in this 
direction has been slightly below the radar, advocated by pro­
business interest groups and advocates before the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules in letters urging the Advisory Committee 
to place this issue on its agenda. A letter from the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce is representative of this movement: 
We also suggest that as the Committee contemplates 
proposals in the future, it should consider 
amendments that address the root cause of our broken 
discovery system: the rule that the producing party 
bears the cost of production. This system, under 
which a plaintiff can propound broad and costly 
discovery requests on a defendant before there is any 
finding of liability, not only encourages unwieldy and 
costly discovery requests, but also runs afoul of a 
defendant's fundamental right to due process. As a 
result, the Committee should consider, over the longer 
term, an amendment requiring each party to pay the 
costs of the discovery it requests, subject to 
adjustments by the court.4 
The topic was treated even more extensively in a letter 
addressed to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (the Standing Committee) from John H. Beisner, a 
include an express recognition of protective orders that allocate expenses for 
disclosure or discovery. Authority to enter such orders is included in the present 
rule, and courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition will forestall 
the temptation some parties may feel to contest this authority."); see also, e.g., 
CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) ("Rule 26(b)(2)(B) limits discovery on electronically stored information 
from sources not 'reasonably accessible,' and provides the court discretion to order 
discovery and specify cost-shifting to obtain that discovery."); Spears v. City of 
Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that even absent a party's 
bad faith, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 grants of "considerable discretion in 
determining whether expense-shifting in discovery production is appropriate in a 
given case."). 
4. U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Public Comment to the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Concerning Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (Nov. 7, 2013). 
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partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom who has testified 
before Congress on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.5 
After setting forth his argument that the producer-pays rule violates 
due process, Mr. Beisner wrote: 
In light of the due process concerns raised by the 
current producer-pays discovery regime, the 
Committee should consider additional amendments to 
the federal rules. One solution would be to establish a 
general rule that each party pays the costs of the 
discovery it requests, subject to adjustments by the 
court.6 
The Lawyers for Civil Justice, a self-declared proponent of "the 
corporate and defense perspective on all proposed changes to the 
FRCP," has expressly stated: "Our current federal rulemaking agenda 
is focused on reining in the costs and burdens of discovery through 
FRCP amendments [including] ... development of incentive-based 
'requester pays' default rules."7 Needless to say, revising the default 
producer-pays rule in this way would tum the current approach on its 
head, presumptively saddling requesters with an ex ante burden of 
funding the expense associated with responding to their discovery 
requests.8 
5. See Examination of Litigation Abuses Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (testimony of John H. Beisner), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
_files/hearings/113th/03132013/Beisner%2003132013.pdf. 
6. Letter from John H. Beisner, partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom LLP, to Johnathan C. Rose, Secretary of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
Procedure of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 2, 2014), [hereinafter 
Beisner letter], available at http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp 
_ skadden _ arps _slate_ meagher _ fl om.john_ beisner _ 1.2.14.pdf. 
7. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-ci vii-procedure.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2015). 
8. Critics of the producer-pays rules tend to argue that the expense 
associated with extensive electronic discovery coupled with the belief that most of 
the requested information is of little practical utility supports their desire to shift 
those costs onto the requesting party. To what extent is this cost/abuse narrative 
valid? Certainly, in some contexts-such as high stakes commercial litigation or 
cases involving one-way fee-shifting-discovery costs can run high. However, 
there is evidence that in ordinary cases the incidence of discovery as well as the 
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Given indications that the Advisory Committee will indeed 
take up the issue of cost-shifting in the context of civil discovery,9 
now is an apt time to evaluate the producer-pays rule and the claims 
of those urging its demise. Specifically, these questions are: To 
what extent is the producer-pays rule imposing costs on parties in 
litigation; are there fairness, policy, or constitutional considerations 
that warrant a revisiting of the rule; and, ultimately, what would a 
rational approach to discovery cost-allocation look like? In the 
passages that follow, we will explore the current landscape of 
discovery expenses in the federal system and the rules governing 
their allocation (Part I), followed in Part II by an exploration of the 
various purported difficulties with a producer-pays approach. Part 
III will then build on these discussions to develop a rational 
approach to cost allocation that appropriately balances the interests 
of litigants on all sides of civil disputes in federal court. 
associated costs tends to be lower than critics suggest. I recently addressed this 
issue in more detail in A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: 
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1730 (2013) ("[T]he 
very source cited by the Court in support of its claim of a discovery problem itself 
admits that discovery is nonexistent in 40 percent of the cases and is limited to 
three hours in a substantial additional percentage of cases . . . "); see also Danya 
Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies 
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088-89 (2012) ("[T]he FJC reported that the 
median cost of litigation for defendants was $20,000, including attorneys' fees. For 
plaintiffs, the median cost was even less, at $15,000, with some reporting costs of 
less than $1600. Only at the ninety-fifth percentile did reported costs reach 
$280,000 for plaintiffs and $300,000 for defendants. The median estimate of 
stakes in the litigation for plaintiffs was $160,000, with estimates ranging from 
$15,000 at the tenth percentile to almost $4 million at the ninety-fifth percentile. 
The median estimate of the stakes by defendants' attorneys was $200,000, with 
estimates ranging from $15,000 at the tenth percentile to $5 million at the ninety­
fifth percentile. . . . [T]he discovery costs that animated the Duke [Civil 
Litigation] Conference organizers and participants did not appear to be, in the vast 
majority of cases, significant or disproportionate."). 
9. Private communication from those involved with the Advisory 
Committee's activities confirms that discovery cost allocation will be an agenda 
item over the next series of meetings. This should not be surprising, given the 
success the corporate defense bar has had in getting other civil rules priorities onto 
the Advisory Committee's agenda; the 2015 amendments are a testament to their 
efficacy in this regard. 
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II. THE EXISTING DISCOVERY COST-ALLOCATION LANDSCAPE 
A. The "American Rule" 
Under the standard practice known as the "American rule," 
each litigant in American courts pays his or her own attorneys' fees 
and expenses.10 This practice contrasts with the longstanding 
approach in England ( and most European countries) that has 
supported fee and cost awards to prevailing litigants for 
centuries11-a practice commonly referred to as the "English rule." 
The American approach has been justified principally as an access to 
justice device, meaning that the rule protects the ability of 
prospective plaintiffs to bring actions that may vindicate their rights 
and does not penalize defendants for merely defending themselves in 
a lawsuit.12 Conversely, English rule defenders tend to highlight its 
10. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975) ("In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to 
collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. 
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) ("The rule here has long been that 
attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or 
enforceable contract providing therefor."); see also Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 
2213 (2011) ("Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own 
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, regardless whether he wins or loses. 
Indeed, this principle is so firmly entrenched that it is known as the 'American 
Rule."'). This principle was first announced and embraced by the Supreme Court 
in 1796 in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 1796 WL 896, at * 1 (1796), 
("We do not think that this charge [for counsel's fees] ought to be allowed. The 
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it, and even if that practice 
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it 
is changed, or modified, by statute."). 
11. Successful plaintiffs in English courts have been entitled to expenses 
since the Statute of Gloucester in 1278, see Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, 
c. 1, while prevailing defendants gained this entitlement in 1607 under the Statute 
of Westminster, see Statute of Westminster, 1607, 4 Jae. 1, c. 3. 
12. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 714. 
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is 
at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged 
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing 
included the fees of their opponents' counsel. 
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purported ability to deter frivolous or weak claims while providing 
full compensation for prevailing parties. 13 Most states in the United 
States adhere to the American rule (generally speaking) , with the 
exception of Alaska.14 
Over time, the courts and Congress have created numerous 
exceptions to the American rule at the federal level, particularly 
regarding attorneys' fees. Numerous federal and state statutes 
provide for shifting the prevailing party's attorneys' fees onto a 
losing party in civil litigation. 1 5 The preponderance of fee-shifting 
statutes tend to be one-way, meaning they impose attorneys' fees on 
losing defendants more so than requiring losing plaintiffs to pay the 
prevailing defendant's legal expenses. 16 The objective of these 
provisions appears to be to encourage the private enforcement of the 
Id. at 7 1 8 ;  see also, e.g., R.M. Palmer Co. v. Ludens, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501-02 
(3d Cir. 1 956) ("It is clear that counsel fees should not be awarded as a matter of 
course, nor as a penalty against the loser who followed conventional procedure."). 
1 3 . See, e.g., HB 1 45-Attorney Fees: Public Interest Litigants, Committee 
Minutes, Alaska H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 23rd Leg. (May 7, 2003) 
(statement of Benjamin Brown, Legislative Assistant, Alaska State Chamber of 
Commerce at 1 :40 PM) ("The [Alaska State Chamber of Commerce] supports 
Rule 82 [attorney's] fees because this modification of the English rule puts an 
incentive into the litigation process that makes people not file frivolous suits and 
realize that there may be a downside to their causing others to spend money to 
defend a suit that is not likely to be prevailed upon."), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HJUD2003-05-07 l 340.PDF; W. Kent Davis, The 
International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the 
"Odd Man Out " in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361 , 
405 ( 1999) ("The English Rule today reflects the rationale that victory is not 
complete in civil litigation if it leaves substantial expenses uncovered."). 
1 4. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 ("Except as otherwise provided by law or 
agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded 
attorney's fees calculated under this rule."). 
1 5 . See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4(a), 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 5(a) (201 2) (antitrust cases); 
42 U.S.C. § 1 988(b) (20 1 2) (civil rights cases). 
1 6 .  State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the 
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 32 1 ,  322 ( 1 984) ("[T]he vast 
majority of state attorney fee shifting statutes allow fee shifting only to prevailing 
plaintiffs."). See also, e.g., The Clayton Act § 4(a) ("[A]ny person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue therefor [sic] . . .  and shal l  recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2 16(b) (20 12) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment 
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid 
by the defendant, and costs of the action."). 
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federal statutes in which they are found. 17 That said, fee-shifting 
provisions that impose an obligation on plaintiffs to pay defendants '  
attorneys' fees can be found within substantive statutory 
provisions.18  
Other two-way fee-shifting regimes tend to be connected 
with litigation conduct by either side that unnecessarily creates legal 
expenses for an adversary, thereby justifying an equitable imposition 
of such expenses on the culpable party. Examples of this approach 
can be found within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at Rule 4 
( expenses and fees resulting from the failure to waive service  
without good cause) ,19 Rule 11 (expenses and fees resulting from 
filings that violate the certification requirements of Rule 1 1  ) ,20 Rule 
16 ( expenses and fees resulting from noncompliance with court 
1 7 .  See, e.g., Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor America, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1 160, 
1 1 7 1  (C.D. Cal. 201 0) ("California's fee-shifting and private attorney general 
statutes incentivize counsel to take cases on behalf of plaintiffs who could not 
otherwise afford to vindicate their rights through litigation."); Turner v. D.C. Bd. 
of Elections and Ethics, 1 70 F. Supp. 2d I , 7 (D.D.C. 200 1 )  ("The fee shifting 
statute is designed to create an incentive for 'private Attorney Generals' to bring 
meritorious lawsuits by vindicating the citizens' rights when the government may 
be incapacitated by political or budgetary considerations from bringing them."); 
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1 33 F.R.D. 4 1 ,  43 (D. Nev. 1 990) 
("[Title 15 U.S.C . § 1 5(a)] also provides for treble damages and attorneys fees, 
creating incentives for private attorneys general."). 
1 8 . See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1 988(b) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of sections 1 98 1 ,  1 98 1a, 1 982, 1983, 1 985, and 1 986 of this title . . .  the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . .  "); 42 U.S.C. § 1 1 1 1 3 
("In any suit brought against a defendant, to the extent that a defendant has met the 
standards set forth under section 1 l l 12(a) of this title and the defendant 
substantially prevails, the court shall, at the conclusion of the action, award to a 
substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the cost of the suit 
attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the claim, or the 
claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous, unreasonable, 
without foundation, or in bad faith."). 
19 .  FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(2) ("If a defendant located within the United States 
fails, without good cause, to sign and return a waiver . . .  the court must impose on 
the defendant . . .  the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of any motion 
required to collect those service expenses."). 
20. FED. R. CN. P. l l (c)(4) ("The sanction may include . . .  an order directing 
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other 
expenses directly resulting from the violation."). 
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orders under Rule 16),2 1  and Rule 37 (expenses and fees resulting 
from discovery misconduct),22 as well as in the Judicial Code at 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (expenses and fees incurred for an improper 
removal),23 and 28 U.S.C. § 1 927 (expenses and fees resulting from 
vexatious attorney misconduct).24 In the absence of express 
authorization, courts have identified circumstances when they have 
the inherent authority to impose fee awards on litigants.25 These 
judicially-created exceptions to the American rule tend to involve 
instances of bad faith misconduct or equitable considerations that 
suggest the propriety of relieving a party of some or all of its 
obligation to bear the costs of legal services in a given case. 26 
With respect to ordinary litigation expenses beyond 
attorneys' fees or the costs arising out of litigation misconduct, there 
have been only limited deviations from strict adherence to the 
2 1 .  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 6(f)(2) ("Instead of or in addition to any other sanction, 
the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay the reasonable 
expenses-including attorney's fees-incurred because of any noncompliance 
with this rule . . . .  "). 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) ("Instead of or in addition to the orders above, 
the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both 
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the 
failure . . . .  "). 
23 .  28 U.S .C.  § 1 447(c) (20 1 2) ("An order remanding the case may require 
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as 
a result of the removal."). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1 927 ("Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in 
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct."). 
25 .  Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S.  32, 45 ( 199 1 )  ("[A]n assessment of 
attorney's fees is undoubtedly within a court's inherent power . . .  "). 
26. The Court in Chambers explained: 
[E]xceptions [to the American rule] fall into three categories. The 
first, known as the "common fund exception," derives not from a court's 
power to control litigants, but from its historic equity jurisdiction and 
allows a court to award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts 
directly benefit others. Second, a court may assess attorney's fees as a 
sanction for the "willful disobedience of a court order." . . .  Third, . . .  a 
court may assess attorney's fees when a party has "acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 
Id. at 45-46 ( citations omitted). 
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American rule. At least since 1853, Congress has authorized taxing 
the losing party for specified costs.27 Today, a similar provision is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Rule 54, under which "costs" such 
as fees for the clerk, witnesses, printing, and copying are 
reimbursable by the losing party to the prevailing party.28 Dismissals 
for lack of jurisdiction can trigger an obligation of the dismissed 
party to reimburse an adversary for such costs,29 as can appellate 
affirmances for litigants who lose on appeal.30 Under Rule 68 an 
unaccepted offer of judgment that is followed by a less favorable 
final judgment will trigger an obligation to cover the costs incurred 
by the adversary from the time of the offer.3 1 An important common 
thread in each of these provisions is the traditional understanding 
that the term "costs" does not ordinarily include attorney's fees, 
unless otherwise provided for by Congress.32 Thus, Rule 68's 
allowance for costs only permits an award of attorney's fees if the 
underlying statute that animates the claim at issue defines "costs" to 
27. Act of Feb. 26, 185 3, 10 S tat. 161 ("That in lieu of the compensation now 
allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors in the United States courts, to 
United S tates district attorneys, clerks of the district and circuit courts, marshals, 
witnesses, jurors, commissioners, and printers, in the several States, the following 
and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed."). 
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (taxation of enumerated costs allowed); FED. R. Clv. P. 
54(d)(l )  ("[C]osts-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the 
prevailing party."). 
29. 28 u.s.c. § 1919. 
30. 28 u.s.c. § 1912. 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d) ("If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is 
not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs 
incurred after the offer was made."). 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 provides nominal amounts taxable as "Attorney's and 
proctor's docket fees," and thus provide a mild departure from the principle of 
taxable costs not including attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (providing that 
"[a]ttorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United S tates may be taxed 
as costs as follows" and then delineating amounts of $5, $20, $50, and $100 of 
such fees depending on the disposition of the matter, e.g., by trial, by 
"discontinuance," by appeal in  admiralty cases, or on motion for judgment, and a 
$2.50 fee "for each deposition admitted into evidence"); see also Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) ("[W]ith the exception of 
the small amounts allowed by § 1923, the rule ' has long been that attorney's fees 
are not ordinarily recoverable . . . .  "' (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967))). 
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include such fees.33 Absent the inclusion of attorneys' fees, these 
cost-shifting rules have tended to be of minimal impact on 
redistributing the financial burdens associated with litigation.34 
B. The Discovery Cost-Allocation Experience under the 
American Rule 
Notwithstanding the number of departures from the American 
rule discussed above, that rule has remained the default principle 
governing how the expenses associated with responding to discovery 
requests are borne. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[u]nder [the 
discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must 
bear the expense of complying with discovery requests . . . .  "35 This 
means that ordinarily, when a party receives a discovery request­
such as a request for documents under Rule 34--the responding 
party must pay for all expenses associated with responding to that 
request, which may include search and retrieval, photocopying, 
forensic reconstruction, travel, human resources, and attorney 
supervision and review.36 As previously mentioned, attorney's fees 
33 .  Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 ( 1 985) ("[T]he term 'costs' in Rule 68 
was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive 
statute or other authority."). There was an unsuccessful effort in 1 995 to amend 
the diversity jurisdiction statute to pennit the payment of an opponent's attorney's 
fees after a litigant received a judgment that was less favorable than one previously 
offered by that opponent. See ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1 995, H.R. 
REP. No. 1 04-62 ( 1 995), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
1 04hrpt62/html/CRPT- 1 04hrpt62.htm. 
34. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 68 advisory committee's note (Proposed 
Amendment 1984), available at 1 02 F.R.D .  407, 433-44 ( 1984) ("[Rule 68] has 
been considered largely ineffective as a means of achieving its goals. The principal 
reasons for the rule's past failure have been ( 1 )  that 'costs' [when they do not 
include attorney's fees] . . .  are too small a factor to motivate parties to use the 
rule; and (2) that the rule is a 'one-way street,' available only to those defending 
against claims and not to claimants."). 
35 .  Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 ( 1 978). 
36. Rule 26(b)(4)(E) provides a notable exception to this default rule by 
requiring "the party seeking discovery" to pay the fee of an opponent's expert for 
the time spent responding to certain expert discovery requests (e.g. a deposition of 
an opponent's expert). FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
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and expenses arising from discovery misconduct are potentially 
reimbursable at the court's discretion under Rule 37.37 
Although producers must bear these costs, the bulk of 
empirical data seems to indicate that overall, the costs of civil 
discovery in the federal system are not disproportionate or 
excessive,38 tending to suggest that for most litigants the need to shift 
discovery expenses onto requesting parties is not compelling. 
However, to the extent the anticipated expenses associated with 
responding to a discovery request are thought to be excessive ( either 
in an absolute or relative sense) in any given case, the federal 
courts-with some license and less guidance from the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure-have developed mechanisms for determining 
whether some or all of those expenses should be shifted to the 
requesting party.39 The inquiry currently employed by federal courts 
involves a multi-factored consideration of issues such as the 
proportionality of the expense, the significance of the information 
sought, its availability from other sources, and the relative ability of 
the parties to cover and control the costs.40 This analysis is typically 
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (imposing "reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees" in instances of discovery misconduct). 
38. I previously discussed the evidence rebutting the notion that overall the 
costs of federal civil discovery are excessive in Spencer, supra note 8, at 1 729-3 1 ,  
a discussion that pointed, in tum, to the work of the Federal Judicial Center and 
other scholars, see Danya Shocair Reda, supra note 8, at 1 088-89 (201 2);  EMERY 
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv l .pdf/$file/dissurv 
1 .pdf; Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L .  REV. 525, 527 
( 1 998); Linda S .  Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of 
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1 393, 1 396 (1 994). 
39. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 2 1 7  F.R.D. 309, 
3 1 7-18  (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 
F.R.D. 42 1 ,  428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (articulating the factors relevant to 
determining the extent to which discovery costs should be shifted to the requesting 
party). 
40. Zubulake I, 2 1 7  F .R.D. at 322. In Zubulake I, Judge Scheindlin set out a 
seven-factor test to be applied to cost-shifting determinations, which were 
themselves a modification of factors previously laid out in Rowe: 
1 .  The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information; 
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applied in the face of electronic discovery that is argued to be not 
reasonably accessible,41  most likely due to the fact that Rule 
26(b ) (2) (B) specifically protects parties against having to provide 
discovery from such sources when doing so would be unduly 
burdensome or costly.42 However, Rule 26(c) ( l ) (B) also provides 
courts the authority to split or shift the costs of discovery-if "good 
cause" is shown-via a protective order,43 an authority that is now 
explicit.44 There was not widespread utilization of this authority 
prior to the advent of electronically stored information (ESI) and its 
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount m 
controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available 
to each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its 
incentive to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information. 
Zubulake /, 21 7 F .R.D. at 322. 
41. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake Ill), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 
(S.D. N.Y. 2003) ("It is worth emphasizing again that cost-shifting is potentially 
appropriate only when inaccessible data is sought. When a discovery request seeks 
accessible data-for example, active on-line or near-line data-it is typically 
inappropriate to consider cost-shifting."). 
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("A party need not provide discovery of 
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost."). 
43. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting 
that a responding party "may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c) 
to grant orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense' in [complying with 
discovery requests], including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting 
party's payment of the costs of discovery"). 
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2014) (amended 2015) ("The court may, for 
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of 
the following: . . .  (B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation 
of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery . . . .  " (emphasis added)). 
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associated costs,45 although some courts have engaged in cost­
shifting beyond the ESI context.46 Even with ESI, the imposition of 
cost-shifting orders seems to be the exception rather than a standard 
practice. 47 Further, the costs that are shifted or shared under these 
rules do not include attorneys' fees associated with retrieval and 
production in response to discovery requests,48 although such fees 
can be shifted as a sanction for discovery misconduct under Rule 
26(g) or Rule 3 7. 
Beyond the cost-shifting that occurs to alleviate production 
expenses thought to be unduly burdensome, there is the statutorily 
authorized shifting of the costs for exemplification and for "making 
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for 
use in [a] case" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 section 4. Under this 
statute, courts may tax such expenses as "costs" awardable to the 
prevailing party under Rule 54.49 This language unquestionably 
applies to the actual photocopying expenses associated with 
discovery but not preparatory costs leading up to the copying.50 The 
45. Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 335-36 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) ("Despite this broad authorization of cost shifting by the Supreme Court 
over thirty years ago, very few Courts took advantage of this authority before the 
advent ofESI."). 
46. See, e.g., Simms v. Ctr. for Corr. Health & Policy Studies, 272 F.R.D. 36 
(D.D.C. 2011) (relieving producing party of obligation to make photocopies due to 
the associated expense and ordering requesting party to review and copy the 
material at its own expense); Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc ., No. 1 :05-CV-0024, 
2008 WL 4449081 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (ordering class action plaintiffs to 
pay half the costs of requested discovery because of the size and limited probative 
value of the information sought); Am. Int' l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. NWI-1, 
Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (ordering the plaintiff and defendants to share 
equally the costs associated with discovery of a particular set of documents). 
4 7. At least among published cases, online legal database searches do not 
reveal a significant number of cases in which the discovery costs are shifted. 
48. See, e.g., Melton ex rel. Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 4: l 1-
cv-00270-RBH, 2012 WL 4322520, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2012) ("[T]he cost 
shifting contemplated by Rule 26(c) provides for shifting of discovery costs, not 
the shifting of attorney' s fees."); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 
568, 577 (N.D. I ll. 2004) (awarding shifting of certain out-of-pocket discovery 
costs but providing that "[e]ach party will bear their own costs of reviewing the 
data .. .. "). 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(l ). 
50. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed .  
Cir. 2013) ("But only the costs of creating the produced duplicates are included, 
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Third Circuit has articulated the dominant view of how § 1920 
applies to the reproduction of electronic material: 
[O]f the numerous services the vendors performed, 
only the scanning of hard copy documents, the 
conversion of native files to TIFF, and the transfer of 
VHS tapes to DVD involved "copying," and that the 
costs attributable to only those activities are 
recoverable under § 1920(4)'s allowance for the 
"costs of making copies of any materials. "51  
In other words, courts have not read § 1 920 as a broad 
authorization to shift all of the costs associated with electronic 
discovery to a losing party but only the expenses associated with 
reproduction. 52 Section 1 920 is thus a narrow provision not seen as a 
vehicle for broadly shifting the costs of discovery onto a losing 
opponent. 53 
In sum, although there are multiple opportunities for litigants 
to seek, and for courts to grant, the shifting of expenses associated 
with responding to discovery requests, they remain limited and stand 
as an exception to-rather than an upending of-the presumption 
that producing parties bear the obligation to incur those costs. 
not a number of preparatory or ancillary costs commonly incurred leading up to, in 
conj unction with, or after duplication."). 
5 1. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d 
C ir. 2012); see also Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 
718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding the Third Circuit's reasoning persuasive 
to not include imaging or metadata extraction costs). 
52 .  See Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 171 ("Neither the language of § 1920(4), nor 
its history, suggests that Congress intended to shift all the expenses of a particular 
form of discovery-production of ESI-to the losing party. Nor can such a result 
fi nd support in Supreme Court precedent, which has accorded a narrow reading of 
the cost statute in other contexts."); see also, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. 
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987) ("Although there may be strong policy 
reasons in general, or compelling equitable circumstances in a particular case, to 
award the full cost of  electronic discovery to the prevailing party, the federal 
courts lack the authority to do so, either generally or in particular cases, under the 
cost statute."). 
5 3. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012); 
Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 170 ("Nor may the courts invoke equitable concerns . . .  to 
j ustify an award of costs for services that Congress has not made taxable."). 
Symposium 201 5] RATIONALIZING COST 783 
II. REVERSING THE PRESUMPTION: SHOULD REQUESTERS HA VE 
TO PAY? 
As noted at the outset, currently on the table is the question 
of whether the presumption that the producing party pays the costs of 
responding to discovery should be replaced with a default 
"requester-pays" rule.54 Note that a move towards the English 
rule-which is a post hoc "loser-pays" regime saddling the culpable 
party with the costs of the victor 's case-is not what proponents of 
change have proposed. Rather, the suggestion is that requesting 
parties should bear the costs of responding to the discovery requests 
they issue ex ante as a matter of course, not as an exceptional 
occurrence done only after a judicial assessment of the propriety of 
such an allocation. Whether the proposal structures itself as a default 
requester-pays rule or in the form of the traditional English rule55 is 
material from a practical perspective (and to a lesser extent from a 
policy perspective) but not so much so from a theoretical and 
constitutional perspective. Below, we will review the various 
constitutional and policy considerations surrounding the proposal to 
move to a default requester-pays system in order to determine 
whether such a course is advisable, warranted, or perhaps even 
compelled. 
A. Constitutional Considerations 
A principal claim made by opponents of the producer-pays 
rule is that it is unconstitutional because it results in the deprivation 
of the producer 's property-its financial resources associated with 
the cost of production-"absent any finding of liability and without 
adequate procedures."56 As Professor Martin Redish and his co­
author have stated, "impos[ing] the nomeimbursable costs of [a] 
plaintiff's discovery on the defendant on the basis of nothing more 
54. See, e.g. , Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
http://www.lfcj.com/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure.html (last visited Mar. 19,  
2015) (urging the "development of incentive-based 'requester pays' default 
rules"). 
55. Recall that the English rule is a post-hoc cost shifting mechanism 
whereby the producing party is subsequently reimbursed if it becomes the 
prevailing party. 
56. Beisner Letter, supra note 6, at 8. 
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than the plaintiff's unilateral allegation of liability surely takes 
defendant 's property without due process" because these costs are 
imposed "without even a preliminary judicial finding of 
wrongdoing. "57 These are serious charges58 with severe 
implications: If this procedural due process challenge59 is correct, 
courts would not be permitted to force producing parties to bear the 
costs of responding to discovery requests, and such costs would 
presumably become the responsibility of the requester. 
To evaluate the strength of this due process claim, we must 
begin with the meaning of the due process right. The text of the 
Fifth Amendment is familiar: "No person shall . . .  be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."60 The Supreme 
57 .  Martin H.  Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery 
Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 807 
(20 1 1 ) .  
58 .  Other scholars have derided this argument as "laughable" and not one to 
be taken seriously because none of its proponents are invoking it as grounds for 
refusing to comply with a discovery request in an actual litigation. That said, the 
argument has been invoked repeatedly and likely will have rhetorical force that 
will permit those already inclined to oppose the producer-pays rule to invoke it as 
justification for making the policy change they desire-a move to a requester-pays 
rule .  Thus, it is important that the argument be taken seriously and evaluated 
honestly rather than simply dismissed out-of-hand so that the results of the analysis 
herein will be less assailable. 
59. None of the proponents of the due process argument appear to be 
claiming that the obligation to cover the expenses of responding to discovery 
requests constitutes a violation of substantive due process-nor could they. 
Substantive due process supplies heightened scrutiny only to impingements on 
"fundamental rights" "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 52 1  U.S. 702, 721-22 (1 997) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). No one could assert-in good faith-that the right not to cover the costs 
of discovery production is a fundamental right. Not being a fundamental right, 
rational basis scrutiny applies, meaning that the government action must be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 728. The 
government's interest in eliciting evidence in civil cases heard by the federal 
courts is obviously a legitimate one and asking each party to cover associated 
expenses-with the opportunity to challenge particularly burdensome costs-is 
certainly a rational approach. See also Redish & McNamara, supra note 57, at 806 
("[T)he forced subsidization of its opponent's  discovery costs gives rise to serious 
concerns about the procedural due process rights of the producing party."). 
60. U.S.  CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, which would apply 
to action by state courts, similarly provides "nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
§ 1 .  
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Court has stated that the "central meaning" of this "procedural due 
process" protection is that '"[p]arties whose rights are to be affected 
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right 
they must first be notified. '"61  However, these protections apply 
only if there is a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Fifth ( or 
Fourteenth) Amendment.62 Thus, two issues present themselves 
when confronted with the claim that the producer-pays rule violates 
due process: First, does obligating a producing party to bear the 
costs associated with responding to civil discovery requests 
constitute a deprivation of the kind embraced by the Due Process 
Clause? Second, if it does, is the party suffering the deprivation 
afforded a constitutionally-sufficient opportunity to be heard in 
connection with the deprivation? 
1 .  A Deprivation? 
Our system of regulation in this country includes both public 
and private enforcement mechanisms. The civil justice system, at 
both the state and federal levels, is the principal means through 
which private wrongs are vindicated. All persons and entities are 
subject to this system, provided the requisites of jurisdiction can be 
satisfied to give a court authority over the defendants in a given case. 
Once lawful jurisdiction is established, all come under the obligation 
to appear and cooperate with the judicial process-including 
discovery-or face sanctions up to and including dismissal or a 
default judgment.63 Appurtenant to that obligation will be the costs 
61. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 
U.S. 223, 233 (1863)). 
62. Id. at 84 ("The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the 
deprivation of an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment' s 
protection."); id. at 86 ("Any significant taking of property by  the State is within 
the purview of the Due Process Clause."); see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1990) ("The first inquiry in  every due process 
challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in 
' property' or ' liberty.'"). 
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); see also, e.g., Kafele v. Javitch, Block, Eisen & 
Rathbone, 232 F.R.D. 286, 289 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that plaintiffs repeated, 
persistent, and willful refusal to participate in discovery process despite earlier 
sanctions warranted dismissal of action); Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. 
Ohio 1973) ("[A] defendant may not completely refuse to participate in pre-trial 
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of participating in that process, which include hiring counsel, 
mailing and filing documents, hiring expert witnesses, producing 
copies of requested information, and the like. Indeed, litigation 
expenses (such as those just described) are an inevitable cost of 
doing business in a society as reliant on private enforcement as the 
United States.64 The question is whether the costs of compliance 
with the judicial process-which are incidental to that process rather 
than its object-can fairly be classified as a constitutional 
"deprivation" such that the protections of due process apply to their 
imposition. 65 
Whether such costs constitute a constitutional deprivation 
depends on the ends they serve. To the extent that the litigation 
expenses in question are expended for the benefit of the party 
incurring the cost, no constitutionally-cognizable deprivation can be 
said to have occurred. It is a well-established principle that property 
employed for the benefit of the complaining party is not a 
deprivation warranting due process protection. In Moody v. Weeks, 
the court articulated this principle in rejecting an inmate's due 
process challenge to being charged $5 per month to cover court 
costs: "The inmate is not absolutely 'deprived' of his funds when 
they are use[ d] to pay court costs and fees because the funds are 
being used for the inmate's benefit."66 In Jensen v. Klecker, the 
Eighth Circuit stated the principle more starkly in terms apropos 
discovery . . . .  "). Of course, the complete failure to defend oneself in an action 
risks a default judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. 
64. This is why under appropriate circumstances litigation expenses are 
deductible against business income. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). 
65. Proponents of the due process argument, to my knowledge, have not 
addressed this particular point, assuming-rather than establishing-that a 
constitutionally cognizable deprivation occurs when a defendant is made to finance 
the expense of producing information requested by plaintiffs in the course of 
litigation. REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 807 ("To impose the 
nonreimbursable costs of plaintiff's disco very on the defendant on the basis of 
nothing more than the plaintiff's unilateral allegation of liability surely takes 
defendant's property without due process. The judicial process has imposed a 
fi nancial burden on the defendant without even a preliminary judicial finding of 
wrongdoing."). 
66. No. l : 09-cv-332, 2009 WL 1728102, at *2  (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2009); 
see also Browder v. Ankrom, No. Civ.A. 4:05CV-P9-M, 2005 WL 1026045, at *5 
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2005), ("[S]uch debits are not ' deprivations' in the traditional 
sense because an inmate has been provided with a service or good in exchange for 
the money debited."). 
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here: "It is important to note that this issue does not involve a 
forfeiture of property or a penalfr, Rather, it is in the nature of an 
assessment for value received."6 Litigation expenses incurred for 
the benefit of the litigant spending them are not being forfeited to the 
government or to the adverse party, nor are they being imposed as a 
penalty for a wrong; rather, they are funds a litigant spends in the 
process of defending itself in court, a defense that provides a benefit 
to that litigant. Thus, ordinary litigation expenses cannot be 
characterized as a deprivation worthy of due process protection.68 
But what of the costs associated with responding to a 
discovery request? Is there something unique about such costs that 
makes their imposition a deprivation that due process will recognize? 
The short answer is no, for three reasons: First, to the extent that 
producing information in response to a discovery request is 
beneficial to the producing party, no constitutional deprivation has 
occurred for the reasons stated above-self-servin� expenditures are 
not classified as constitutional deprivations.6 Under what 
circumstances would producing information in response to a 
discovery request be beneficial to the producing party? Clearly, such 
would be the case if the information produced were exculpatory from 
67. 648 F.2d 1 1 79, 1183 (8th Cir. 1 981); see also Bailey v. Carter, 1 5  F. 
App' x  245, 251 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We question whether the inmates were truly 
'deprived' of their property, however. The copayment fee was deducted from their 
accounts in exchange for medical services."); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1 281,  
1 287 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Moreover, prisoners are not absolutely deprived of the use 
of their funds when those funds are applied toward the filing-fee requirements. 
The funds are being utilized for the prisoner's benefit just as a non-indigent' s 
money is used by him to proceed in federal court."). 
68. Professor Redish seems to concede this point in part when he writes, 
[I]t is important to distinguish the burdens caused by the forced subsidy 
[ of the cost of production] from the normal costs incurred by a defendant 
in preparing his own case after a complaint is filed. Unlike the costs 
incurred by a defendant in mounting his own case, the costs involved in 
responding to a plaintiffs discovery requests are a financial benefit that 
the defendant is required-at the risk of severe sanctions-to provide to 
the plaintiff on the basis of nothing more than the unilateral filing of the 
plaintiffs complaint. 
REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 81 0. 
69. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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the perspective of a producing defendant7° or probative of the 
producing party's claims or defenses because in those circumstances 
the information would be supportive of the producing party's 
position in the litigation.7 1 As a result, the expense would be 
beneficial to the producing party and thus not a constitutionally 
cognizable deprivation. 72 
Conversely, the information produced may be inculpatory or 
probative of the requesting party's claims or defenses and thus used 
against the producing party. In this situation, Professor Redish and 
his coauthor believe that producing parties are forcibly-without due 
process-being made to subsidize their adversaries: "Because each 
party bears the costs of producing the information that will be used 
against it by its opponent, each party effectively subsidizes that 
portion of its opponent's case.',73 However, when the information 
produced tends to confirm the defendant-producer's liability (or the 
meritlessness of the plaintiff's claims in the event the plaintiff is the 
producing party) this analysis should fail because the producer has 
unclean hands; a litigant should have no equitable claim to a right to 
withhold information tending to refute its litigation position or to 
70. Producing plaintiffs, having initiated the action, are likely not in a 
position to challenge the legitimacy of having to pay to produce material in 
response to proper discovery requests from the parties they have sued, given such 
plaintiffs' own invocation of  the discovery process to prosecute and support their 
own claims. 
71. This is a distinction that seems to be recognized, at least implicitly, by 
advocates of  a requester-pays rule in their failure to complain (in the context of the 
contemporary debate) of having to pay the costs of producing documents pursuant 
to the initial disclosure obligations of Rule 26(a). Those disclosures are expressly 
limited to " information . . .  that the disclosing party may use to support its claims 
or defenses," i.e. information whose production is beneficial to the producing 
party. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)( l )(i) & (ii) (emphasis added). 
72. Such exculpatory information may not be exclusively beneficial to the 
producing party; the information might also be of some benefit to the requesting 
party's litigation position as well. However, so long as the information is of some 
benefit to the producing party, the claim o f  a constitutional deprivation cannot be 
maintained. 
73. REDISH & McNAMARA, supra note 57, at 792. Unmentioned is the fact 
that the taxpayers, in tum, subsidize these costs through their deductibility against 
tax liability as business expenses. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (allowing deductions for 
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year 
in carrying on any trade or business"). 
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saddle the requester with the expense of discovering such 
information. 
More basically, though, the argument that having to bear the 
costs of production in civil litigation is a constitutional deprivation 
fails because if the information has evidentiary value in a live 
dispute, the court and all parties are entitled to access it, and those in 
possession of the information have a duty to provide it. As the 
Eleventh Circuit once stated, "[t]here is a fundamental responsibility 
of every person to give testimony, and the duty to provide evidence 
has long been considered to be almost absolute."74 Further, this duty 
obtains notwithstanding the fact that it may be accompanied by 
burdens such as incurring expenses or opportunity costs. As one 
court explained the point: 
The Professor claims that having to produce his 
records and give testimony would be burdensome. 
He claims that to require him to be available in every 
lawsuit would create an extraordinary hardship on 
him and that the court should protect him. His claim 
must be kept in context with the way in which the 
system of administrating justice affects every citizen. 
Every person is burdened by having to disclose 
knowledge he acquires, even though it is acquired 
purely by accident. A person who sees an auto 
accident cannot refuse to testify because it burdens 
him. A person who witnesses a will cannot refuse to 
testify. All are burdened, yet some are burdened more 
than others.75 
Clearly, the mere fact of a financial burden arising out of 
complying with lawful discovery obligations itself cannot constitute 
a constitutional deprivation. What the Constitution protects against, 
rather, is the imposition of unreasonable or excessive burdens.76 So 
74. Klay v. All Defendants, 425 F.3d 977, 986 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) . 
75. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
76. See United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 130 (3d 
Cir. 1967) ("If the Fourth and F ifth Amendments accord any protection it could 
only be from the imposition of an unreasonable and excessive financial burden."). 
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long as the information sought is relevant to the dispute and the costs 
of producing the requested information are reasonable, the expenses 
are an ordinary incident of doing business and a constitutionally 
cognizable deprivation cannot be said to have occurred.77 
This test-whether the information is relevant to the dispute 
and the reasonableness of the costs of compliance-crystalizes for us 
the constitutionality of the default producer-pays rule in the federal 
courts because the discovery rules are designed to ensure that 
responding parties bear the cost of production only under these 
conditions. On the first point-relevance to the dispute-the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure permit only the discovery of information 
that is "relevant to any party's claim or defense;"78 although a good­
cause showing formerly could serve as grounds for expanding the 
scope of discoverable information to material relevant to "the subject 
matter involved in the action,"79 that allowance was eliminated from 
the Rule. 80 Thus, the discovery requests to which parties have a duty 
to respond are only those seeking information relevant to a claim or 
defense actually asserted in the action. On the second point, the 
Federal Rules give producing parties the right to object to discovery 
that would impose unreasonable costs. 81  
Currently, then, if the information requested is useless, 
irrelevant, or too expensive, the Federal Rules afford a producing 
party a process whereby it can challenge-ex ante, in an adversarial 
process before an impartial judge-both the propriety of the request 
and the producer's obligation to cover the expenses associated with 
that request. Rule 26(c) entitles responding parties to seek protective 
orders when that party believes it is entitled to protection "from 
77. See United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Minn. 1 973) 
("[T]he bank complains that the financial burden of compliance would be 
considerable, such that it would amount to a deprivation of property without due 
process of law . . . .  Since the material sought by the Internal Revenue Service is 
relevant to a legitimate investigation, the bank has the duty of full cooperation, 
including the diligent search for and production of all records requested. The 
expenses incurred in producing such records are reasonably incident to the bank's 
normal operations and should be anticipated as a cost of doing business as a 
bank."). 
78. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l )  (2014) (amended 20 15). 
79. Id. 
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l )  (lacking language permitting such an 
allowance). 
8 1 .  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)( l ). 
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annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense. "82 Thus, in the very circumstance when the costs and 
benefits of the requested information are in question, responding 
parties are not forced to pay for such information until after a hearing 
on their objection occurs. We will return to an expanded discussion 
of the constitutional sufficiency of this process below. 83 
Recall that we are exploring the reasons why bearing the 
costs of producing information in response to civil discovery 
requests is not ordinarily a constitutional deprivation. The first was 
that productions that benefit the litigation position of the producing 
party cannot be regarded as deprivations; equitable considerations 
preclude complaints about the costs of giving information harmful to 
one's litigation position; and when one might be able to claim a 
deprivation-the obligation to pay for discovery that is unreasonably 
expensive or not relevant to the dispute (or both) -the Federal Rules 
provide for a prior hearing that can result in a protective order 
against such an obligation. The second reason why the producer­
pays rule is not a constitutional deprivation is that the Due Process 
Clause has always been understood to apply to government 
appropriations of, or impositions on, property or property rights, not 
to adverse economic consequences that are the mere incidents of 
lawful governmental action. Long ago, in the Legal Tender Cases, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
That provision [the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment] has always been understood as referring 
only to a direct appropriation, and not to 
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of 
lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any 
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work 
harm and loss to individuals.84 
From that time, it has been clear "that the due process 
provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect 
adverse effects of governmental action."85 Thus, the incidental  
82. FED. R. CIV. P .  26(c)( l )  (emphasis added). 
83. See infra Part II.A.2. 
84. 79 U.S. (7 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870). 
85.  O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980). 
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adverse economic consequences of enforcement of a statute cannot 
be challenged as unconstitutional deprivations of property. 86 
Similarly, the incidents of complying with properly instituted judicial 
action may not be cast as deprivations warranting due process 
protections. This includes the obligation to comply with discovery 
orders; if the court orders a producing party to produce information 
relevant to the dispute, the expenses associated with doing so are 
nothing more than "consequential injuries resulting from the exercise 
of lawful power," not a constitutional deprivation. 
Third, and most compelling, is the fact that giving evidence 
in aid of a judicial process is a universal duty owed by all, entitling 
none to a claim of compensation for the reasonable costs incurred 
thereby. The Supreme Court clearly indicated that the giving of 
evidence is an obligation. In Blackmer v. United States, the Court 
wrote, "It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which the 
citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of 
justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he 
is properly summoned."87 Continuing in this vein, the Court in 
United States v. Bryan noted, quoting Wigmore: 
"For more than three centuries it has now been 
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public 
. . .  has a right to every man's evidence. When we 
come to examine the various claims of exemption, we 
start with the primary assumption that there is a 
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of 
. . ,,gg g1vmg . . . .  
86. Detweiler v. Welch, 46 F.2d 71, 74 (D. Idaho 1930) ("[A] statute should 
not be rendered unconstitutional because the property of persons is subjected to 
restraint, or that expense results to individuals from the enforcement of the 
statute."). 
87. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); see also United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 33 I (1 950) ("[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by 
competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are 
necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative 
and j udicial machinery."). 
88. Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d 
ed.) § 2192 (1940)). 
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As a solemn public duty, the Court has admonished that "this 
obligation persists no matter how financially burdensome it may 
be. . . . 'The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary 
contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public. "'89 As 
such, there is no due process right to be compensated for the costs of 
complying with the obligation to give evidence to a governmental 
authority pursuing lawful objectives: "the Fifth Amendment does not 
require that the Government pay for the performance of a public duty 
it is already owed. "90 
Applying this concept in the discovery context clearly 
precludes a claim of a due process problem simply based on having 
to bear the costs of producing information within the permissible 
scope of discovery in a civil action. When a bank raised such a 
challenge in response to an IRS summons seeking the production of 
certain business records, the court rejected the assertion that 
"requiring the Bank to expend the funds required to comply with the 
summons would amount to a taking of property without just 
compensation and deprive it of property without due process of law" 
and concluded that the bank had "no right to reimbursement under 
the Fifth Amendment."91 That said, there does seem to be a need for 
the incidental costs of compliance to be reasonable.92 As noted 
above, the Federal Rules provide producing parties every 
opportunity to object to paying the costs of production if they are 
unreasonable and to do so prior to havin§ to bear the costs, in an 
adversary proceeding before the judge.9 So, again, when the 
reasonableness of the production costs ( or the relevance of the 
information) is in question-which are the only circumstances under 
which one might be exempted from the otherwise generally 
applicable obligation to give evidence-the Federal Rules provide 
for a process to resolve the matter. Thus, all that remains is to assess 
whether that process is sufficient from a constitutional perspective. 
89. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 ( 1973) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 28 1 ( 1 9 19)). 
90. Hurtado, 410  U.S. at 588. 
9 1 .  United States v. Covington Trust & Banking Co. ,  43 1 F. Supp. 352, 354-
55 (E.D. Ky. 1 977). 
92. Id. at 355 (holding that respondents had no right to reimbursement 
because "the summons imposes no unreasonable financial burden on the Bank"). 
93 . FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(l). 
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2. A Constitutionally Sufficient Process? 
Assessing the constitutionality of imposing the costs of 
responding to discovery on producing parties in civil litigation only 
partially depends on determining whether a constitutionally 
cognizable deprivation has occurred. Any deprivation that might be 
identified under such circumstances would have to occur in the 
absence of the reqms1te procedural protections to be 
unconstitutional. For those instances in which a litigant is compelled 
to produce material to another party at its own expense, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure put in place an adversarial hearing at which 
a judge will determine the propriety of imposing that obligation.94 Is 
this a constitutionally sufficient process? 
The Federal Rules limit the scope of discovery to information 
relevant to a claim or defense95 and afford parties the opportunity to 
object if a request exceeds that limit or would impose "undue burden 
or expense. "96 These restrictions cabin discovery within the 
boundaries of what the government-through the courts-has the 
right to demand of those who have evidence relevant to a pending 
judicial proceeding. Recall that within these confines, no 
constitutional deprivation occurs and all have a duty to cooperate 
without compensation.97 However, the Federal Rules give producing 
parties the opportunity to assert that the requested production would 
fall outside of the permissible scope of discovery-either due to 
irrelevance or undue burden-prior to having to produce the 
information. This is done through a motion for a protective order; 
movants have the opportunity to present their arguments against 
having to comply with a discovery request to a judge.98 Thus, an 
order compelling a party to produce material at its own expense 
comes only after a pre-deprivation hearing at which the producing 
party has had the opportunity to be heard. After this hearing, the 
court may order the discovery if appropriate or order that the costs of 
94. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c)(l ). 
95. Id. In the current version of the Rules, there is no longer the ability to 
obtain discovery related to the subject matter involved in the action. See supra note 
80 and accompanying text ( discussing the grounds for expanding the scope of 
discovery that are eliminated from the new Rules.) 
96. Id. 
97. Supra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(l ). 
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such discovery must be shared with or shifted to the requesting 
party.99 
Is this type of hearing one that comports with due process? 
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated a threefold inquiry to 
assess the constitutional sufficiency of procedures that accompany 
governmental deprivations of property based on Mathews v. 
Eldridge: ( 1 )  consideration of "the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."10O 
When the deprivation is at the behest of a private party, the third 
consideration is revised to embrace consideration of the interest of 
the party seeking the deprivation, along with "any ancillary interest 
the government may have in providing the procedure."101  
For civil discovery requests, the private interest to be affected 
by the discovery is the financial costs associated with compliance.  
However, so  long as  the costs are not unduly burdensome and are 
connected with the production of information within the permissible 
scope of discovery, no constitutional deprivation occurs. Further, the 
hearing that Rule 26( c) provides minimizes the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation because it permits a judge to assess the propriety of the 
discovery request before the deprivation occurs, ensuring that it is 
consistent with the relevance and proportionality constraints the 
Federal Rules place on discovery.1 02 Finally, the party requesting the 
information has an interest in receiving it to the extent it relates to a 
claim or defense actually raised in the action, as such information 
will further their ability to prosecute or defend against asserted 
claims. Similarly, the government has an interest in arriving at a 
99. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(c)(2) (2014) (amended 2015) ("If a motion for a 
protective order is wholly or partly denied, the court may, on just terms, order that 
any party or person provide or permit discovery.") .  There is now an explicit 
authorization to order cost-sharing in Rule 26(c)(l )(B). 
100. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
101. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. I ,  11 (1991). 
102. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 
(1972) ("When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior 
hearing is paramount."). 
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resolution of the dispute on the merits, which can only be aided by 
having access to information relevant to the claims and defenses 
raised in the action. It seems beyond doubt, then, that in those 
instances where having to pay the costs of production would 
constitute a constitutional deprivation-the production of irrelevant 
or unduly burdensome information-an appropriate pre-deprivation 
hearing is provided consistent with what the Constitution requires. 
As further protection, litigants only gain access to the 
entitlements of discovery after surmounting additional procedural 
hurdles that permit the dispute to be heard. Most obviously, civil 
defendants must be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court 
before being bound. 103 More importantly, defendants are obligated 
to respond to complaints that meet the minimum pleading 
requirements of Rule 8(a) as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In 
the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 04 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 105 plaintiffs must substantiate their allegations with sufficient 
facts to make their claims plausible. 106 This obligation was 
developed expressly to address the supposed prior ability of 
plaintiffs to gain access to discovery on too thin of a basis. 107 The 
need for plaintiffs to articulate facts showing plausible entitlement to 
relief mirrors the similar obligation claimants had in Mitchell v. WT. 
Grant Co., in which a writ of sequestration could only issue when 
"the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear 
from specific facts shown by a verified petition or affidavit."108 This 
1 03. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 ( 1980) 
("Due process requires that the defendant . . .  be subject to the personal jurisdiction 
of the court."). 
1 04. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
1 05. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
1 06. Id. at 678 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a c laim to relief that is plausible 
on its face."' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
1 07. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will 
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those 
proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that 
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially 
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the 
discovery process will reveal relevant evidence to support a § 1 claim." (citation 
omitted)). 
1 08. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605 ( 1974) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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safeguard, among others, was deemed to be important in legitimizing 
the deprivation occasioned by the writ in Mitchell, notwithstanding 
the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing for the adversely affected 
party. 1 09 In the context of civil discovery, plaintiffs have similarly 
specified the plausibility of their claims and-as noted above-must 
further demonstrate (if challenged) that the information they seek is 
within the relevance and proportionality limits of discovery to a 
judge. Thus, civil defendants in the federal system are compelled to 
respond to discovery requests only in those actions in which 
plaintiffs have demonstrated plausible entitlement to relief, not just 
any claims that a plaintiff may have imagined, and only after a court 
determines that the request does not fall beyond the proper scope of 
discovery. An adversarial, pre-deprivation hearing before a judge is  
the gold-standard of due process and cannot be seriously challenged 
as constitutionally deficient. 
Although Professor Redish acknowledges the screening 
function of the Twombly-Iqbal ("Twiqbaf') standard, he dismisses i t  
as a constitutionally insufficient means of  protecting defendants 
against the obligation to provide discovery at their own expense. 1 10 
What he misses, however, is the fact that not all instances of self­
financed compelled discovery production constitute constitutionally 
cognizable deprivations. Professor Redish also ignores the fact that 
prior to imposing production obligations that would constitute a 
deprivation-the production of irrelevant or unduly burdensome 
information-there indeed is an adversarial, pre-deprivation hearing 
before a neutral decision maker. Here, we make note of the 
threshold Twiqbal pleading hurdle not to indicate its status as a 
sufficient pre-deprivation protection against improper discovery; 
rather, the pleading requirement is cited for the role that it plays in 
ensuring that discovery is cabined by claims that have demonstrated 
plausibility rather than claims that are purely speculative in nature. 
That standard contributes to the assurance that the deprivation is not 
erroneous; that is, by permitting only plausible claims to gain access 
to discovery, the risk that discovery obligations are being imposed in 
aid of meritless or baseless claims is greatly reduced. 
It is worth mentioning that in addition to the pre-deprivation 
hearing that a producing party may avail itself of under Rule 26(c), 
109. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605. 
110. REDISH & MCNAMARA, supra note 57, at 807- 1 0. 
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the certification and sanctions provisions of Rule 26(g) provide an 
additional layer of protection against improper discovery requests 
that would constitute a constitutionally cognizable deprivation. 
Requesting parties must certify that their requests are consistent with 
the rule, not interposed to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, 
and are not unreasonable or unduly burdensome. 1 1 1  Violation of this 
certification requirement subjects the offending party to the 
imposition of sanctions, which can include the reasonable 
expenses-including attorneys' fees-caused by the violation. 1 1 2 
Not only does this provision have deterrent value to the extent it 
discourages wayward discovery requests, it provides for a post hoc 
compensation scheme that makes the producing party whole in the 
event it incurs costs as a result of improper discovery requests. 
Certainly, the protection provided by Rule 26(g) will depend on how 
willing the court is to enforce it, a consideration to which we will 
return when considering discovery reforms below. 
In sum, only requests outside the scope of discovery or those 
that are unduly burdensome constitute constitutionally cognizable 
deprivations. The Federal Rules provide for a pre-deprivation, 
adversary hearing before a judge to determine whether the discovery 
sought falls within or beyond this permissible scope. Only litigants 
who have demonstrated plausible entitlement to relief gain the right 
to invoke discovery with respect to their claims. Litigants who in 
fact interpose inappropriate discovery requests can be sanctioned in a 
way that makes the responding party financially whole. Needless to 
say, any effort to disparage this process as constitutionally 
insufficient is baseless. 
B. Policy Considerations 
Although there is no constitutional prohibition against 
requiring producing parties to bear the reasonable costs of 
responding to permissible discovery requests, that does not mean that 
such an approach is the most appropriate way to allocate these costs. 
The next question, then, is whether the producer-pays rule makes 
sense from a policy perspective. More specifically, what are the 
consequences of a producer-pays rule compared with a requester-
1 1 1 . FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l )(B). 
1 1 2. FED. R. CIV. P.  26(g)(3). 
Symposium 2015] RATIONALIZING COST 799 
pays approach, and how do those consequences bear on litigants' 
goals and on the goals we collectively have for civil litigation more 
generally? Civil litigation is a mechanism through which civil law 
enforcement objectives are achieved. These objectives include the 
encouragement of law compliance (specific and general deterrence) ; 
the peaceful resolution of disputes on their merits, the remediation of 
harm ( compensation) ; and--derivatively-the development of the 
law.1 1 3 A meta-objective would be the achievement of these 
objectives in a manner consistent with due process and with 
standards of efficiency and proportionality. 1 1 4 What role, if any, does 
the producer-pays approach play in furthering or frustrating the goals 
of civil litigation? 
There are not studies to date--of which this Author is 
aware-that study the impact of the various discovery cost-allocation 
approaches discussed in this Article. However, there have been 
numerous writings that address the relative merits of the American 
rule versus the English rule, which allocate the overall legal 
expenses associated with litigation. Unfortunately, empirical studies 
attempting to measure the respective impacts of these competing 
regimes are limited and have reached seemingly inconsistent or 
inconclusive results. 1 15 For example, a Florida medical malpractice 
study suggested that under the English rule-which applied to 
1 1 3. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment 
Discrimination law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 426-27 ( 1 999) ("Civil 
litigation accomplishes more than a simple resolution of the dispute . . . .  [j]udicial 
adjudication generates specific and general deterrence, educates the public, creates 
precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values."). 
1 1 4. FED. R. CIV. P. l (2014) (amended 2015) ("[T]hese rules . . .  should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding."). Rule l now reads, "These rules . .  
. should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)( I )  (20 1 4) (amended 20 1 5); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(b)(l )  ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 
case . . . .  ") (underlined portion indicates changes made). 
1 1 5. Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts Determine Fees in a System 
With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and 
Defendants, 60 UCLA. L. REV. 1452, 1458 (201 3) ("Although a vast theoretical 
literature exists on litigation costs, much of it need not be described here. The 
literature has been reviewed elsewhere and is of limited relevance to this study 
because it reaches few consistent predictions or prescriptions."). 
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medical malpractice claims in Florida-claim quality increased, 
settlement rates decreased, and plaintiffs obtained higher 
recoveries. 1 1 6 Another study focused on Alaska's loser-pays regime 
found little effect to the extent that tort filings were similar to other 
U.S. jurisdictions following the American rule. 1 1 7 An experiment 
that sought to mimic American and English rule environments 
demonstrated an increased likelihood of settlement under the English 
rule, a result that runs counter to the Florida malpractice study. 1 1 8  
Theoretical treatments of the topic have similarly yielded 
inconsistent perspectives on the probable impact of varying 
approaches to cost allocation. 1 19 One scholar seemed to suggest the 
futility of attempts to make predictions in this area when he wrote: 
[T]he current state of economic knowledge does not 
enable us reliably to predict whether a move to fuller 
indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of 
litigation, let alone whether it would better align those 
costs with any social benefits they might generate. 
1 16. Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for 
Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3 45, 378 
(1 990) [hereinafter Snyder & Hughes, The English Rule]; James W. Hughes & 
Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American 
Rules: Theory and Evidence, 3 8  J.L. & ECON. 225, 225-26 (1 995) [hereinafter 
Hughes & Snyder, Litigation and Settlement]. 
1 1 7. See SUSANNE Dr PIETRO ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ,  ALASKA'S 
ENGLISH RULE ATTORNEY'S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 81  (1 995)("[A]laska's 
statewide tort filing trends resemble those in U.S. jurisdictions that do not shift 
attorney's fees. The similarity suggests that fee-shifting in Alaska does not cause 
differences between Alaska's trends and those elsewhere."). 
1 1 8. Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior 
Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. 
L. & ECON. 16 1 ,  1 62 (1 988). 
1 1 9. Professor Herbert Kritzer summed this point up nicely when he wrote, 
"There is surprisingly little agreement among those who have undertaken these 
theoretical analyses. Some analysts argue that fee shifting should increase the 
likelihood of settlement, while others argue that it will increase the likelihood of 
cases going to trial. Some argue that fee shifting will decrease the number of cases 
filed, while others argue that the numbers of cases will increase." Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical 
Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1 943 , 1 948 (2002) (citing various 
articles). 
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The reason for · this agnostic conclusion is 
straightforward. Legal costs influence all aspects of 
the litigation process, from the decision to file suit to 
the choice between settlement and trial to the question 
whether to take precautions against a dispute in the 
first place . . . . The combination of all these external 
effects are too complicated to be remedied by a 
simple rule of "loser pays." Instead, indemnity of 
legal fees remedies some externalities while failing to 
address and even exacerbating others. 1 20 
80 1 
I make no attempt to improve upon existing theoretical or 
empirical assessments of the relative merits of the American versus 
the English rule here. I offer the above brief overview simply to 
indicate that we may not be able to obtain concrete guidance on that 
issue as we seek to determine the optimal approach for allocating the 
costs of civil discovery. That said, can we still attempt to reason 
toward some conclusions regarding what the impact of various 
discovery cost-allocation approaches might be? 
Regarding the impact of discovery cost-allocation on claim 
initiation and claim quality, it seems reasonable to assume that from 
the perspective of a rational prospective litigant, the imposition of 
greater costs on litigating a claim would permit that litigant to 
proceed only if i t  could perceive a greater potential benefit to justify 
those expenses. This perception of one's own claim quality and 
likelihood of success may or may not comport with actual claim 
quality, but at a minimum, the claimant must have some increased 
measure of confidence in success to justify pursuing a claim at a cost 
of x + n as opposed to a cost of x. For this to be true, prospective 
claimants would have to have reasonably accurate information about 
what those costs are likely to be, as well as some means of properly 
assessing the merits of their respective claims. Further, the 
magnitude of the increased costs-reflected in the likely discovery 
costs the claimant will have to bear-would have to be sufficient to 
matter to the decision to bring the claim; relatively negligible 
discovery costs or costs that would be largely outweighed by a 
recovery are less likely to deter the bringing of claims. Finally, 
1 20. Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 64-65 (Boudewijn  Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000). 
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claimants could reduce the costs they bore under a requester-pays 
regime by modifying or narrowing their requests, which would 
potentially lessen the deterrent effect of such a regime. As this brief 
exercise demonstrates, the lament excerpted above that predicting 
the impact of the competing indemnification regimes is a fool's 
errand may have some merit: The array of factors, information 
deficits, and contingencies that bear on the decision to initiate a 
lawsuit may be too numerous, complex, and amorphous to isolate the 
impact of cost-shifting on that decision. 
Although this may be so, I would surmise that there is a 
degree of discovery expense that, if placed at the feet of claimants, 
could be sufficiently large to discourage the bringing of some 
number of claims. It simply is unclear what that level would be in 
proportion to the value of the overall claim (although I would guess 
having to spend anything approaching, say, 50% of one's anticipated 
claim value might begin to deter one from pursuing a claim at all) . 
W hat is clear is that were such a level to be reached, the impact 
would be the deterrence of some frivolous or meritless claims but 
also of some number of legitimate claims, particularly those that 
might have negative value (meaning the potential recovery is 
outweighed by the expense of pursuing the claim) . 
How would such an outcome impact the objectives of civil 
litigation outlined above? On the one hand, the elimination or 
reduction of frivolous claims would lessen the chance that litigants 
who are not entitled to a recovery under the law will nonetheless 
obtain a recovery due to financial incentives for the defendant to 
settle-an outcome that would promote greater resolution of disputes 
on their merits. On the other hand, however, to the extent valid 
claims would be deterred, under-enforcement would result. This 
means that a larger number of law-violators would go unpunished 
and thus undeterred, undermining the specific and general deterrence 
goals of civil litigation. The remedial goals of litigation would also 
be underserved, as actual victims would not obtain compensation for 
wrongs simply because the costs of seeking vindication were too 
high. All of this said, without being able to know where we are on 
the over-deterrence-under-deterrence spectrum, it is difficult to 
argue that more or less deterrence-through-cost-allocation is needed. 
What of the narrower impact of discovery cost-allocation 
rules on discovery itself? If we assume that the impact of these rules 
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on case initiation and claim quality is indeterminate, might there be 
an independent and discemable impact such rules have on discovery, 
such as the overall cost of discovery, the number and scope of 
discovery requests, or the production of information useful to a 
resolution of the dispute on the merits? The goal of discovery is to 
produce information that permits a resolution of the dispute on its 
merits, which is an objective of civil litigation more generally. 
Discovery rules that facilitate the production of relevant and 
probative information further that goal, while rules that permit or 
encourage either the concealment of such information or the 
production of irrelevant information do not. Raising the costs of 
seeking and obtaining information from one's adversary likely would 
have the effect of forcing a party to narrowly confine its requests to 
those which are most likely to be useful to the requesting party. 12 1 
That is a positive result in one sense, in that frivolous requests for 
information could be minimized. But an alternative impact could be 
a chilling effect on requests that might prevent useful information 
from being discovered, something that would impede the effort of 
the parties and the court to resolve the case on its merits and, likely, 
adversely impact enforcement objectives. A useful avenue for future 
empirical research would be to attempt to assess the impact of cost­
allocation rules on the discovery process itself. That said, it seems 
clear that making it free to request information from one's adversary 
does nothing to incentivize requesting parties to limit their requests 
to the information they truly need. Indeed, requesting parties have 
an incentive (albeit an improper one) 122 to request more information 
of little to no utility given, that such requests impose costs on their 
respective adversaries 1 23 -costs that can alter the calculus of whether 
to proceed with or to settle a case. 
12 l .  See Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their 
Allocation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 885, 894 (2012) ("[P]lacing the costs of discovery 
provisionally on the person asking for it . . . may . . .  give incentives for the 
optimal production of information . . . . "). 
1 22. The Federal Rules prohibit making discovery requests for the purpose 
of driving up an adversary's costs. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g)(l )(B)(ii) (requiring 
attorneys to certify that a discovery request is "not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost 
of litigation"). 
1 23. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 5 1  
DUKE L.J. 56 1 ,  603 (200 1 )  ("[T]he fact that a party's opponent will have to bear 
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What conclusions, if any, can we draw from this brief 
discussion of how the various cost-allocation approaches might 
impact claim quality and the quality of discovery? It seems as if 
moving towards either end of the spectrum between raising and 
lowering costs for one litigant or the other simply modulates from 
achieving more or less deterrence from bringing claims or 
interposing discovery requests, which in tum may either frustrate or 
facilitate our larger law enforcement objectives. Such a situation 
calls for a balanced approach that takes the facts of a given case into 
account to determine the most appropriate allocation of costs under 
the circumstances. A flat rule that the producer pays under all 
circumstances-regardless of relevance or the reasonableness of the 
costs-would clearly be inappropriate, as it would permit requesting 
parties to saddle their adversaries with sufficient discovery costs to 
coerce them into acquiescing to their claims. But, a flat rule that the 
requesting party has to pay the costs associated with responding to 
its requests would be no less inappropriate, as such a rule would 
deter meritorious claims and legitimate discovery requests, and 
would permit producing parties to bury information in ways that 
make its recovery cost-prohibitive, as well as incentivize responding 
parties to drive up production costs as a means of burdening 
requestors. 
Fortunately, the current discovery system opts for neither 
approach. Under the Federal Rules, litigants are not free to impose 
massive discovery expenses on their adversaries with impunity. 
Requesting parties are under an obligation to confine their requests 
to the relevant and the reasonable or face sanctions.1 24 Producing 
parties can challenge compliance with those strictures before a judge 
prior to having to respond. 125  Are these protections sufficient? The 
fact that requested information might be relevant does not mean that 
the information is necessarily going to be useful to the case. Further, 
there will be times that relevant information will be costly to produce 
and yet a court may deem that those costs are reasonable, meaning 
producing parties will incur an obligation to pay significant sums to 
respond. In this situation, should producers have to pay? Finally, if, 
the financial burden of preparing the discovery response actually gives litigants an 
incentive to make discovery requests . . . .  "). 
1 2 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (g). 
1 25. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c). 
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after having borne the costs of production in response to discovery 
requests, the producing party ultimately prevails in the litigation, 
might that party justly claim entitlement to the reimbursement of 
such expenses to be made whole? The next section fleshes out some 
possibilities for modifying the current approach to allocating 
discovery expenses that might address some of these concerns and 
more rationally align with the objectives of civil litigation and 
fairness to the litigants. 
Ill. RATIONALIZING OUR APPROACH TO COST ALLOCATION 
As noted above, it may be difficult to assess the impact of 
various approaches to allocating discovery expenses. My goal in this 
Part is to articulate a framework for the rational allocation of such 
expenses among litigants based on policy principles and fairness 
considerations. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides a useful starting point, as it commands that the Federal 
Rules should be "construed and administered . . .  to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 126 In the 
discovery context, this means that discovery should facilitate a 
resolution of the dispute on its merits Gust), should not be unduly 
time-consuming (speedy), and the expense associated with discovery 
should be minimized (inexpensive). The Federal Rules further these 
objectives by limiting discovery to information that is relevant to a 
claim or defense, requiring that discovery be "proportional to the 
needs of the case," and permitting producing parties to object to 
unduly burdensome discovery and obtain a court order reallocating 
associated costs.127 What additional measures might further advance 
the goals of making discovery just, speedy, and inexpensive? 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 .  
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (20 1 4) (amended 2015) ("Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim 
or defense . . . . "); FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) (2014) (amended 2015) ("The court may, 
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .  "); FED. R. Crv. P. 
26(b) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 
relevant to any party's claim or defense andyroportional to the needs of the case 
. . . " (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P.  26(c) ("The court may, for good cause, 
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the 
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Justice is served by the full disclosure of information that will 
assist the court in resolving the dispute between the litigants on its 
merits. But justice is disserved by discovery requests not designed to 
yield useful information. Without commenting on the degree to 
which such impositional discovery requests128 are interposed (for 
that is not knowable), it cannot be denied that the current rules 
permit (practically speaking) such requests to be made. One way to 
minimize the ability to make impositional discovery requests, of 
course, would be to saddle requesting parties with the cost of 
responding to those requests. However, as noted above, such an 
approach could deter legitimate requests that might contribute to a 
resolution on the merits. Further, making requesting parties bear that 
expense could provide an incentive to producing parties to 
manipulate such costs in a manner that unduly burdens the requester. 
Below, I briefly introduce three alternatives to a requester-pays 
approach that would better balance the interests of justice and cost­
efficiency. 
A. Judicial Prescreening of Discovery Requests 
One of the most promising alternatives might be to 
reintroduce the judge into the discovery request process, at least in 
cases in which discovery is likely to be ( or is certain to be) expensive 
and contentious. Prior to 1 970, parties had to seek court orders 
to obtain discovery from another party and could only do so on 
a showing of good cause. 1 2
9 The 1970 amendment to Rule 34 
eliminated the requirement to show good cause and removed 
the court from the process so that the rule could "operate 
following: . . . (B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of 
expenses, for the disclosure or discovery." (emphasis added)). 
128. I borrow this term from Frank Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery As 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637-38 (1989) ("[A]n impositional request is one 
justified by the costs it imposes on one's adversary rather than by the gains to the 
requester derived from the contribution the information will make to the accuracy 
of the judicial process."). I do so without endorsing or embracing the range of 
views propounded by Judge Easterbrook in the piece. 
129. The pre-1970 version of Rule 34 read, "Upon motion of any party 
showing good cause therefor . . . the court in which an action is pending may [] 
order any party to produce . . . any design ated documents . . . which constitute or 
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination 
permitted in Rule 26(b) . . .  " FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1969) (repealed 1970). 
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extrajudicially."1 30 One could imagine returning to the pre-1970 
version of the rule for discovery-intensive cases, requiring 
parties to submit their discovery requests to the court, which 
would then screen the requests for their propriety. Part of the 
good-cause showing would not only be a demonstration of the 
relevance of the information requested but an articulation of why 
it is needed and how it would advance a resolution of the 
claims. Certainly, having to convince a judge of the propriety of a 
discovery request would chasten litigants in what they seek, at least 
to a greater degree than the purely lawyer-directed discovery 
approach-where judicial intervention in discovery disputes is rare 
and often avoided. 
To be sure, taking this approach would not be feasible 
or warranted in most cases, given that judicial dockets 
are overloaded and that most cases involve little discovery. 1 3 1  
However, judges should be encouraged to identify cases in which 
such prescreening of discovery requests would make sense. There 
could also be a mechanism for parties to request such intervention. 
When it is deemed that prescreening discovery requests would 
be worthwhile but would be an overly time-intensive process 
for the court, magistrates or discovery special masters could be 
tasked with the job. Rule 1 6(c)(2) already provides district 
judges with this authority. Specifically, Rule 16( c )(2)(F) empowers 
a court to "take appropriate action" with respect to "controlling 
and scheduling discovery, including orders affecting disclosures 
and discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37." 1 32 Further, 
Rule 16(c)(2)(H) permits judges to take action with respect 
to "referring matters to a magistrate judge or a master," 
which, of course, is buttressed by the authority given the court under 
Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 for federal magistrate judges, and under 
Rule 53 for masters. 1 33 Indeed, there are cases in which special 
masters have been used to handle discovery; 1 34 under this suggestion, 
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970 Amendment. 
131. See Reda, supra note 8, at 1089 ("[At] the median, the reported costs of 
discovery . . .  constituted 1.6% of the reported stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the 
reported stakes for defendants."). 
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F). 
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(H), 53, 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012). 
134. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F .R.D. 173, 17 4 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("After careful reflection, the court is satisfied that the magnitude 
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however, their role would not be limited to post hoc resolution 
of discovery disputes but rather to ex ante determinations regarding 
the propriety of requested discovery. It is important to understand 
that a blanket approach of prescreening is not being suggested, 
for most cases do not have discovery warranting this 
additional step. But for those that do, such pre-production 
intervention by a neutral third party could be helpful in facilitating 
meaningful, tailored discovery requests that do not impose undue 
expense. 
B. Loser-Pays Cost-Shifting 
In addition to strengthening judicial involvement in 
the discovery-request process in appropriate cases, it may be worth 
considering whether post-adjudication cost-shifting would fairly 
serve the interests of incentivizing appropriate and proportionate 
discovery requests while pennitting an information exchange 
that leads to a decision on the merits. As previously discussed, 
Rule 54( d) ( l )  empowers courts to award "costs"--not including 
attorneys' fees--to "the prevailing party." 135 Costs, in tum, 
are defined in a very limited way in 28 U.S.C. § 1 920 to include the 
following: 
of the case, the complexity of the anticipated discovery problems, the sheer 
volume of documents to be reviewed, many of which are subject to claims of 
privilege, the number of witnesses to be deposed, the need for a speedy processing 
of all discovery problems in order to meet the trial date established in this order, all 
argue in favor of using a special master to supervise discovery . . . . ") . 
1 35. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d)(l )  ("[C]osts-other than attorney's fees-should 
be allowed to the prevailing party."). Compare this "prevailing party" language to 
provisions that make attorney's fees available for those who "substantially 
prevail." See, e.g. , Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i)-(ii) 
(20 1 2) ("The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees 
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in 
which the complainant has substantially prevailed."); Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(l)(A) (20 1 2) ("[In] any civil proceeding to 
forfeit property under any provision of Federal law in which the claimant 
substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees 
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant."). It is unclear to 
what extent the slightly more liberal "substantially prevails" language impacts 
litigant behavior versus the impact of the "prevailing party" language in cases to 
which that latter standard applies. 
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1 .  Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
2. Fees for printed or electronically recorded 
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
3. Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
4. Fees for exemplification and the costs of making 
copies of any materials where the copies are 
necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
5 .  Docket fees under section 1923 ofJhis title; 
6. Compensation of court appointed experts, 
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, 
expenses, and costs of special interpretation 
services under section 1 828 of this title.1 36 
809 
Given the realities of electronic discovery, there may be 
warrant for revising § 1920 to include a broader range of costs 
associated with producing material in response to discovery 
requests. 1 37 Rather than limiting reimbursable discovery costs 
strictly to those arising from reproduction, the fuller range of 
expenses connected with producing electronic discovery, such as the 
search and retrieval process and associated e-discovery vendor costs, 
would go much further in making a prevailing party whole. Further, 
the prospect of having to pay such expenses in the event of defeat 
should ensure that discovery requests are kept within the confines of 
what would be truly meaningful to the case. 
Unfortunately, many of the problems that would result from 
moving to a requester-pays system would exist under a loser-pays 
rule. The prospect of having to pay such expenses on the back-end 
could over-deter discovery requests, leading requesting parties to fail 
to seek information that would be useful to the case for fear of 
having to pay. Further, for some plaintiffs in particular, there may be 
no realistic ability for them to cover what could be hundreds of 
1 36. 28 u.s.c. § 1 920 (20 12). 
1 37. Note that my proposal for post hoc shifting of discovery expenses is 
limited to expenses incurred responding to discovery requests; I am not suggesting 
that expenses incurred in building one's own case be shifted. 
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thousands of dollars or more in discovery expenses borne by their 
opponents that prevail in the litigation. As a result, some legitimate 
claims could be deterred altogether under such a regime. 
Avoiding such an impact could be achieved in part by the 
development of some sort of after-the-event litigation insurance that 
one could purchase to cover the potential discovery-expense 
liability. 1 38 Another approach, could be for judges in such cases to 
be vigilant in making sure that the discovery expenses to be shifted 
are themselves reasonable and not unduly trumped up by the party 
who initially incurred them, an assessment courts already make 
under circumstances when currently authorized cost-shifting 
mechanisms are employed. 1 39 Additionally, an alleviating factor that 
would practically minimize the actual burden placed on litigants by 
post-judgment cost-shifting, would be the fact that the loser-pays 
rule would only be invoked upon a judgment after a trial, not on a 
summary judgment or other preliminary termination of the case ( or, 
at least the rule could be written in a way that so limited its 
applicability). Judgments on verdicts after a trial are extremely 
rare; 1 40 thus, the instances in which post hoc cost-shifting would 
1 38. See Collin M. Davison, Fee Shifting And After-The-Event Insurance: A 
Twist To A Thirteenth Century Approach To Shifting Attorneys ' Fees To Solve A 
Twenty-First Century Problem, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1 1 99, 1 201-02 (20 1 1 )  
("England has developed an insurance product known as after-the-event insurance 
to provide funding for litigants who cannot afford the cost of the other party's 
attorneys' fees should they be unsuccessful in litigation."). 
1 39. For example: 
[I]n arriving at an appropriate award of reasonable fees and costs, the 
Court must strike a balance between the two considerations outlined 
above: namely, (i) the extent to which Plaintiffs and their counsel devoted 
excessive time and resources to the discovery effort at issue, and (ii) the 
extent to which the conduct of the City and its counsel thwarted 
Plaintiffs' reasonable attempts to secure the e-mails sought in their 
discovery request or, failing that, to obtain relief from the City's 
destruction of these emails. 
Flagg v. City of Detroit, No. 05-74253, 201 1 WL 6 1 3 1 073, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
9, 20 1 1 ) .  
1 40. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS app. tbl. C-4 (20 14), available at http://www.uscourts.govNiewer 
.aspx? doc=/uscourts/Statistics/F ederalJudicia!CaseloadStatistics/20 l 4/tables/C04 
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occur would be relatively rare as well. That said, the potential for 
cost-shifting post-trial will necessarily factor into each litigant's 
risk-reward assessment at earlier stages of litigation, which in turn 
will likely impact whether and how a case settles. 14 1 There may be 
other ways to blunt the potential of this proposal to over-deter 
legitimate claims and discovery requests, such as vesting judges with 
discretion to shift less than all ( or none) of the discovery expenses to 
the losing party based on factors such as ability to pay or the 
reasonableness of the defeated claims or defenses. 142 But the 
underlying propriety of the approach in terms of fairness seems 
clear: After a party prevails in litigation, some degree of the costs 
incurred in supplying material to the losing party in discovery should 
be recoupable. Future research efforts should be designed to study 
what the range of impacts of a post-hoc cost-shifting regime might 
be and how they could be mitigated. 
C. Better Case Management 
Before concluding, it must be urged that judges have within 
their power the case-management tools necessary to address many of 
the discovery cost concerns that defendants have today. Phased 
discovery-which involves the prioritization of discovery with 
Mar14.pdf (showing that for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2014 only 
1.2% of all civil cases reached trial). 
141. See Laura Inglis et al., Experiments on the Effects of Cost-Shifting, 
Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST.  
U. L. REV. 89, 1 16 (2005) ("Our subjects tend to behave rationally when 
confronted with changes in the magnitude of court costs. The overall settlement 
rate under low costs was 58.7% compared to 77.7% under high costs. High costs 
increased the number of settlements across all treatment variables. This suggests 
that high court costs create strong incentives for settlement."). 
142. Such a "judge-centered" approach characterizes what is done in Israel; 
their process and its impact was studied in Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts 
Determine Fees in a System With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to 
Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1452 (2013). The study' s 
findings revealed that judges used their discretion in a variety of ways to vary how 
post hoc cost-shifting was implemented across different categories of cases and 
depending upon the nature of the parties involved. See id. at 1457-5 8 ("Our 
findings suggest that Israeli judges operate multiple de facto litigation cost 
systems: a one-way shifting system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays 
system that operates when publicly-owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays 
system with discretion to deny litigation costs in all other cases."). 
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respect to some matters whose resolution might eliminate the need 
for later discovery-is a potential means of minimizing the burden 
that producing parties will bear that courts should consider when 
appropriate and useful. Parties are encouraged to consider phased 
discovery within their discovery plans under Rule 26(f)(3)(B). 
Judges can and should enter protective orders under Rule 502 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to reduce the costs associated with overly 
meticulous pre-production privilege review.143 Judges can require 
parties to tailor their discovery requests in a manner that will reduce 
the expense associated with responding to them. Pre-production 
cost-shifting is already permitted under the Federal Rules if the 
producing party is able to demonstrate undue burden; judges should 
not shy away from recognizing these burdens and ordering cost­
shifting or sharing when appropriate. 144 When shifting the costs 
would be too burdensome for the requesting party to bear, judges can 
help the parties reach an agreement regarding the requests or 
protocols for identifying responsive material that might be able to 
reduce these costs. Clearly, there will be cases in which high 
discovery costs will be unavoidable and someone will have to bear 
them, and there may be no solution for such cases. But there is 
enough that can be done in most cases in which discovery is an issue 
either under the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or under 
the approaches proposed above that recourse to an ex ante requester­
pays rule would seem to be unnecessary. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The principal purpose of this Article is to address the nascent 
argument that the producer-pays rule should be abandoned in favor 
of a requester-pays rule for constitutional and policy reasons. What 
is clear is that there is nothing unconstitutional about the producer­
pays rule because unreasonable, inappropriate, or disproportionate 
discovery requests can be blocked by recourse to a protective order 
from the judge. Once declared to be within the scope of discovery 
143. FED. R. Evrn. 502(d) advisory committee's note ("Confidentiality 
orders are becoming increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege 
review and retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery."). 
1 44. Recall that there is explicit authorization to order cost-sharing under 
Rule 26(c)( l )(B) since amendments took effect on December 1 ,  201 5. 
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and otherwise reasonable given the needs of the case, the producing 
party has had a hearing and no deprivation can be said to have 
occurred under such circumstances. The policy argument against 
moving to a requester-pays rule is equally strong: The over­
deterrence of legitimate claims and appropriate discovery requests 
would fundamentally undermine access to justice and the resolution 
of disputes on their merits in ways that would ultimately compromise 
the larger law-enforcement objectives of the civil justice system. 
Less clear is what alternatives can be employed to address the 
issue of excessive discovery expense when it is a problem in a case. 
Absent any rule changes, it seems that judges or their delegees will 
have to take responsibility for better policing this issue by shaping 
discovery in a way that minimizes expense and cabins discovery 
within confines that are reasonable given the needs of the case. 
However, the labor-intensiveness of such an approach, plus the 
potential for unduly constraining the ability of litigants to pursue 
information they feel would be helpful to their litigation position, 
may favor supplementing it with some form of post-judgment cost­
shifting that requires the losing party to reimburse the winning party 
for some portion of its discovery expenses. Whatever approach is 
taken, let us hope that it is designed and implemented in a manner 
consistent with the need to nurture, rather than thwart, access to civil 
justice by those with legitimate claims. 
